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The politician who champions a more active political role for the people is a most intriguing individual. Politicians, it is generally assumed, seek power (Downs, 1957). But there are some who sincerely talk of mobilising and empowering the people, apparently at the expense of their own influence. The United States was host to a number of such individuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, men like William Jennings Bryan, Robert M. La Follette and others (Hofstadter, 1955). The Progressive movement, of which they were part, transformed American democracy as new practices – including the initiative, the recall and the direct primary – recast the political landscape (Goebel, 2002, 4). Curiously, however, the Progressive-Era advocacy of direct democracy had ‘no analogue in Europe’ (King, 1997, 11). To be sure, some European contemporaries favoured increasing popular involvement in political decision making; the framers of the 1919 Weimar Constitution, for instance, were imbued with ‘a democratic spirit’ and incorporated into it provisions for initiatives and referendums (Braunthal, 1959, 313). But that spirit was exceptional. Most European elites talked about and understood democracy in limited and representative terms (Dalton et al., 2003, 7-8). 
Today, in contrast, European elites seem to espouse the virtues of democracy and participation in droves. From Willy Brandt’s 1969 call for West Germans to ‘risk more democracy’, through numerous British politicians’ calls for referendums on various EU treaties, to Ségolène Royal’s candidacy in the 2007 French Presidential elections and her theme of la démocratie participative, politicians of all political shades can be heard calling for government to be brought closer to the people, and for the people to be more actively involved in decision making. While their motives, as well as their sincerity, may vary, it remains truly remarkable that politicians have become such vocal advocates for greater popular participation and an effective reduction of their own autonomy. It is, therefore, surprising that little effort has been made to chart and analyse this phenomenon. It is even more surprising that little effort has been made to explain it and consider its implications. 
This article seeks to open up this important subject for further inquiry. It draws on evidence from party manifestos to explore changes in political parties’ public statements about democracy in three established and particularly influential European democratic systems: post-war Britain, the French Fifth Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. It first introduces our analysis of manifestos. It then sketches changes over time in manifesto references to democracy in each country, before discussing apparent cross-national trends and possible explanations for these trends. Finally it highlights some consequences of the changes we identify. 
	
PARTIES AND PARTY MANIFESTOS
Modern liberal democracy means representative democracy. All democratic systems have a clear division of political labour, between elected politicians, who govern, and the people who elect them. The nature of that division differs from country to country, and it changes over time; but it is enduring. 
Political parties are central to and essential for organising that division. They are ‘the major actors in the system that connects the citizenry and the governmental process’ (Klingemann et al. 1994, 5). Or, to use Giovanni Sartori’s formulation (1976, 28), they are ‘expressive instruments’ that transmit citizens’ demands on the one hand and manipulate public opinion on the other. Although recent years have heard much talk about the decline of political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000), they continue to perform vital democratic functions, like mobilising participation, structuring voters’ choices, aggregating interests into general policy packages and, in parliamentary systems, making accountability practicable by controlling the make-up of governments. Even forms of direct democracy tend to be strongly mediated by parties (Budge, 2006). Parties also make strategic decisions that shape democracy and the division of labour in fundamental ways. Because parties control the levers of power in democratic systems, they are crucial forces for extending formal democratic opportunities for citizens.
Our analysis of party manifestos is first and foremost an entry point into exploring changes in what party politicians have said and thought about democracy. Many other sources could shed light on the matter, including interviews, speeches and parliamentary debates. Some scholars have even used elite-level survey data to compare attitudes towards democracy (Bowler et al., 2003). But political scientists interested in the subject’s temporal dimension must draw on textual evidence (Weber, 1990, 9). We focus on manifestos, formal programmes that parties publish ahead of elections and particularly authoritative texts (Budge et al., 2001, 3). Manifestos contain the ideas, values and policies that a party considers most important, or which they think will resonate with voters. Changes in manifesto content thus indicate changes in the ideas, values and policies that parties and their politicians espouse.
At least one study has already drawn on manifestos to explore changes in parties’ rhetoric concerning democracy. Miki Caul Kittilson and Susan E. Scarrow (2003) use data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to explore changes in the saliency of democracy as an issue in party manifestos across eighteen liberal democracies. They draw on a single CMP variable, ‘democracy’, which is a measure of the proportion of a manifesto’s sentences coded as ‘Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organizations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country’s democracy’ (Budge et al., 2001, 223).​[1]​ By examining changes over time in this variable, Kittilson and Scarrow report a very modest general increase in democratic rhetoric between the 1960s and 1990s, albeit with much national variation. 
Following Kittilson and Scarrow (2003, 76-77), Table 1 (below) reports changes in the CMP ‘democracy’ variable in respect of post-war Britain, the French Fifth Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, that is to say changes in the percentage of party manifestos coded as being ‘favourable mentions of democracy’.​[2]​ It reports the percentages by decade in order to illustrate general trends. The parties listed include the most politically significant parties in the three political systems, those that have been in represented in government or who have been an important presence in the legislature. In Britain, these parties included the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberals (the Liberal Democrats since 1988) (Webb, 2000). In France, they include the Gaullists (and their subsequent neo-Gaullist incarnations), the Centre-Right, the Socialists, the once influential Communists and the Greens (Knapp, 2002).​[3]​ And in Germany, they include the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union, the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats and the Greens (Scarrow, 2002). Figure 1 shows by decade the national averages, based on these parties.
As both the national averages reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate, the national trends differ. Democracy gradually became more salient in British party manifestos from the 1940s through to the 1960s, before peaking in the 1970s. After that decade, its saliency declined. Democracy also became much more prominent in French manifestos in the early post-war era, again peaking in the 1970s. Germany appears to be the exception among the countries: democracy as an issue was most salient in party manifestos during the 1950s, not the 1970s. In fact, since the 1950s, the general trend in manifesto references to democracy has been one of steady decline, although there was a slight increase in the issue’s salience in the 2000s.
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 Table 1 also highlights very obvious inter-party differences in manifesto content (Kittilson and Scarrow, 2003, 62-64). In Britain, Liberal party manifestos were most likely to mention democracy; in all decades in the post-war era, its manifestos invariably contained the highest average percentage of sentences coded as ‘democracy’. In contrast, democracy was least salient in Conservative manifestos in all decades. Among the major French parties, the picture is much less clear. Democracy was most salient in the Socialists’ manifestos in the 1950s and 1970s, in the Centre-Right’s manifestos in the 1960s, in the Communist’s manifestos in the 1980s and in the Greens’ manifestos in the 1990s and 2000s. Only the Gaullists failed to top the list in any decade. In Germany, the Greens, too, were most likely to talk about democracy in the elections they contested. Before the 1980s, it was the Free Democrats’ manifestos which generally contained the highest proportion of favourable references to democracy. The exception was the 1950s, when democracy was most salient in the Social Democrats’ manifestos. The Christian Democrats, like the British Conservatives, were always least likely to talk about democracy.
Needless to say, collapsing the data into decades has the effect of reducing variation and smoothing out the trends. Thus the average ‘modest increase’ in democratic rhetoric reported by Kittilson and Scarrow actually conceals a far more complex – and possibly even random – story. Much more importantly, the CMP data mask major qualitative shifts in the way parties actually refer to democracy, how they conceptualise democracy, and the different values they espouse about the proper role of the people in political decision making. As we will show, the CMP data inevitably paint a partial picture of changes in manifesto content; they conceal significant changes in the language that parties actually use.

DEMOCRACY IN PARTY MANIFESTOS
In order to explore more fully changes in parties’ stated views about democracy, our analysis draws on actual readings of manifestos in their original languages.​[4]​ Our sample comprised the manifestos of the British, French and German parties listed in Table 1. Together, we read through 152 manifestos: 51 British manifestos spanning general elections between 1945 and 2005; 46 French manifestos spanning legislative elections between 1958 and 2007;​[5]​ and 55 German manifestos spanning federal elections between 1949 and 2005.​[6]​ We simply read through the manifestos and identified those passages and statements relating to the formal processes of democracy, noting the policy contexts in which the references were made and any normative values associated with democracy.​[7]​ 
We should, at this point, make clear that we were concerned primarily with one general type of reference to democracy: those that related to the nature of individual citizens’ involvement in political processes and decision making. Politicians may obviously talk about democracy in a number of other senses too. They may talk about it as a form of government, one that is to be compared, usually favourably, with other forms of government. Politicians may also talk about the characteristics of their own democratic system and its component parts, for example, the relative power of the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive, or the means by which votes are translated into legislative representation or power, or the proximity of decision making to the people. Or, to use Arend Lijphart’s (1999) framework, they may conceivably talk about how centralised and concentrated political power is in their system and whether it embodies, or should embody, consociational or a majoritarian principles. Left-wing politicians above all may also talk about democracy in economic life and the importance of involving employees in corporate decision making. 
The manifestos we read contained some references to democracy as a form of government, many references to the institutional characteristics of their own particular democracy and a number of references to workplace or industrial democracy. However, we were interested principally in those references to democracy that touched upon the role of the people in formal governmental decision making, and which addressed questions such as: Who should participate? How should they participate? And how often should they do so? 
We found that such references could be grouped together by six general themes: (1) pronounced enthusiasm for active citizen participation; (2) specific support for the elective principle and increasing the number of political offices to be filled by direct election; (3) pledges, both vague and specific, to extend the scope of direct democracy and the use of referendums and initiatives; (4) specific support for increasing democratic inclusivity, in terms of extending the franchise and relaxing candidacy requirements; (5) a commitment to create good citizens, that is, individuals who are actually able to participate in democratic politics; and, finally, (6) expressed concerns about individuals’ disengagement from formal political processes. We made a simple list of which parties’ manifestos, in which years, referred to democracy in one or more of these terms. For the sake of completeness, we also listed three themes that had some bearing on politicians’ conceptions of the role of the people, but which related primarily to the systemic workings of democracy, including decentralising the polity and moving decision making closer to the people, empowering the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive, and changing the voting system so that votes are translated proportionately into representation and power.
By actually reading the manifestos in their original languages, we were able to analyse mentions of democracy in their full context and to explore more fully changes in the way political parties have talked about it. 

BRITAIN
Table 2 summarises the various democratic themes in British manifestos by election and by party. Some themes were addressed in two or three successive manifestos, but not in a third or fourth. Others were mentioned in all but a few of the same party’s manifestos. What is clear, however, is that immediately after the Second World War, there was relatively little talk about democracy from the point of view of individual participation. Democracy, when it was referred to at all, was usually couched in representative terms. Thus the Liberals in 1945 noted that ‘democratic control, through Parliament and elected local authorities, over all those in official positions’, was, along with the rule of law, one of ‘two essential safeguards against injustice and oppression’. The parties’ manifestos generally made few pro-participatory noises in the 1940s and 1950s and said virtually nothing about direct democracy. Other themes attracted occasional but limited attention. Labour’s 1950 manifesto referred briefly to educating good citizens, and its 1959 manifesto considered lowering the voting age. The Liberals in 1959 referred briefly – and only briefly – to instituting elected Scottish and Welsh parliaments and to the British people’s cynicism towards politics and politicians. 
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The same decades also saw the parties talking favourably about decentralising power, a consistent theme of subsequent British manifestos, and the Liberals routinely calling for electoral reform and the introduction of a more proportional voting system. But otherwise, the early post-war manifestos reflected a wider feeing that British democracy was working well. 
The language used and the values espoused began to change in the 1960s and 1970s, however. As Table 2 again illustrates, there was greater diversity in the parties’ references to democracy. The Labour party was particularly vocal in championing popular participation. In its 1964 manifesto, it stated:

Labour does not accept that democracy is a five-yearly visit to the polling booth.… We are working for an active democracy, in which men and women as responsible citizens consciously assist in shaping the surroundings in which they live, and take part in deciding how the community’s wealth is to be shared among all its members. 

Thus, participation was coming to be talked about almost as a good in itself. The 1970 Labour manifesto maintained, ‘people [had] to assume greater responsibility themselves’ because the future depended ‘as much on how people use the power they have as on the action government may take.’ Meanwhile, the Liberals, in their February 1974 manifesto, pledged ‘to democratise the vast bureaucracies which run our Education system, our Industrial Relations and our Health and Welfare services’, all for the purpose of furthering the goal of ‘people participation’. 
The 1960s and 1970s also saw a greater prominence given to themes and practices that could help extend popular participation. In 1974, Labour crossed a Rubicon and called for a national referendum over Britain’s membership of the European Community. Meanwhile, almost every Labour and Liberal manifesto during these decades made some reference to the elective principle, either in relation to their opposition to then largely hereditary House of Lords or the need to create elected Scottish and Welsh assemblies. The theme of inclusivity was also more prominent as the parties talked about lowering the voting age to 18. 
The themes that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were still present in British manifestos in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Both Labour and the Liberals consistently advocated the extension of the elective principle to the House of Lords and new devolved assemblies; in 1997, Labour even promised ‘democratic innovations’ in local government, such as directly elected mayors. The theme of inclusivity was also increasingly prominent, whether in terms of increasing the number of women and minority candidates at parliamentary elections, or extending postal-voting opportunities, or lowing the voting age to 16, as the Liberals pledged in 2001 and 2005. Finally, direct democracy became a recurring theme with promises to hold referendums for determining, among other things, Britain’s adoption of the European single currency, the introduction of devolved assemblies, local government reform and changes to the voting system.
Even the Conservatives, who had long been lukewarm about extending or intensifying democratic practices, came to talk about ways of increasing citizen involvement in political decision making. To be sure, as their 1997 manifesto made clear, the party remained committed to ‘the democratic supremacy of parliament as representatives of the people.’ Yet, there was no escaping a growing emphasis on participation in their programme. The Conservatives abandoned their long-standing opposition to an elected House of Lords in 2001, and in 2005 they pledged to introduce elected police commissioners and to hold referendums in Wales to determine the future of the Welsh National Assembly and in the United Kingdom as a whole on the (subsequently aborted) European Constitution.
One final aspect of British manifestos worth highlighting concerns parties’ own reflections on the health of democracy, an irregular theme for much of the post-war period. In 1966, the Liberals expressed concern at the ‘the present electoral apathy’, and in February 1974 they suggested that ‘Politics has gone away from the people’. But in recent years, as Table 2 indicates, such concerns have become more pronounced and shared by all parties. In 2005, after two consecutive terms in office, Labour’s manifesto addressed the perceived problem of political disengagement.

Our political institutions – including our own party – must engage a population overloaded with information, diverse in its values and lifestyles, and sceptical of power. However, people are passionate about politics – when they see it affects them.

In Britain in 2005, the party of government appeared to be saying that democracy was not just about making government work; rather, government was, at least in part, about making democracy work.

FRANCE
As Table 2 did for Britain, so Table 3 summarises the various democratic themes in French manifestos by election and by party. One finding of immediate interest is that, while the CMP data suggest that the French parties were consistently more likely to make favourable references to democracy than British parties (see Table 1), comparatively fewer themes were addressed in the French manifestos in the 1950s and 1960s.​[8]​ Instead, in the first decade of the Fifth Republic, talk of democracy was manifestly rhetorical and targeted at the problems confronting France, especially the loss of Algeria (Mouré and Alexander, 2002). Parties across the political spectrum defended democracy as a way of restoring political stability and French grandeur. In the words of the 1958 Gaullist manifesto, ‘Democracy under the Fifth Republic will enable France to keep the rank she deserves in the world.’ For the Communists that year: ‘There is no possible greatness [for France] without a genuine Democracy’. 
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When French manifestos referred to democracy, they usually did so in the sense of the country’s own governing arrangements. One recurring theme of the manifestos was the balance of power between the directly-elected president and the National Assembly, with the parties of the left tending to make the case for a stronger parliament. As recently as 2002, for example, the Greens went so far as to suggest a radical restructuring of France’s semi-presidential system: the president should be elected by parliament and the president’s powers should be confined to powers of arbitration. A related theme was the voting system used to elect the National Assembly, with the Communists, like the British Liberals, almost making the issue of introducing proportional representation their own. They favour a strong assembly; they oppose a majoritarian voting system. Other parties have, at different times, made similar calls; indeed, France briefly experimented with a party-list voting system in the 1986 elections under a Socialist government. 
The most prominent systemic-level theme in French manifestos was the decentralisation of power to local and regional bodies (Levy, 2001). This was an issue that all the major parties embraced, initially in 1968 after the student protests of that year and consistently from the 1980s. In 1981, for example, the Gaullists presented decentralisation as a way to give citizens more power over their own affairs:

The state must not domineer over citizens’ lives in the smallest detail. Rather, it must give them the means to take charge by upgrading the role of local authorities.… Départements and communes are more knowledgeable than any Parisian minister.

Eighteen years later, on a similar theme, the Socialists pledged that they would ‘bring the state closer to the citizen by relaunching decentralisation and disentangling … state tasks.’ 
In contrast to the overt preoccupation with the institutional structures of Fifth Republic democracy, Table 3 shows that concerns about extending individual citizens’ involvement in political decision making has been only a sporadic feature of French manifestos, at least until recently. Of the various democratic themes relating to the role of the people, the most prominent has been an enthusiasm for popular participation. As early as 1967, the Gaullists said France needed ‘citizens who participate in the management of their political, economic and social affairs.’ In their 1967 manifesto, the Centre Right argued: ‘Democracy requires that citizens be urged to take responsibility at all levels – local, regional, professional’. The rhetoric may not have been as strong as that of some British Labour party manifestos of the same era, but the sentiments were the same.
As Table 3 also shows, however, enthusiasm for participation only became a consistent theme in French manifestos from the 1990s. At the same time, talk about participation has been joined by more specific talk about direct democracy. All five parties have made noises in this area. For example, the Communists promised in their 1997 manifesto to increase participation by extending the use of consultations and introducing popular initiatives. However, the most vocal advocates of direct democracy have been the Greens. In 2002, for example, the Green manifesto proposed introducing the right of initiative, the right for citizens to petition for referendums and the more general right for citizens ‘to interrupt public deliberations at all levels with interpolations’.
In previous decades, the parties of the left, the Communists and the Socialists, had expressed opposition to the referendum device, largely because of its use by de Gaulle and subsequent presidents for their own ends (Morel, 2007, 1050-1). For instance, over a decade after the Communists had criticised de Gaulle’s ‘Bonapartist aspirations’ for initiating a referendum to establish a directly elected president, their 1973 manifesto still maintained: ‘Referendums must not be used anymore as a means to endorse presidential policies directed against the parliament’. Today, however, the referendum seems to be viewed with less suspicion. 
Other themes, such as the extension of the direct-elective principle or the pledge to create good democrats, received less attention. There has been limited talk about introducing direct elections to the French Senate, a suggestion that has been put forward by the Communists and Greens during various elections. Thus, the Communists argued in 1978 that ‘The Senate will be rendered more representative by democratising its mode of election’. However, French parties do no seem to be as concerned about the composition of their second chamber as British parties are about theirs. French parties have also had little to say about creating a good citizenry. Only the Greens touched upon this issue in 2007, when they say argued: ‘To give … power to the citizen is first of all to guarantee him a decent life because nobody can really fulfil their role as citizen if they live in fear of tomorrow’. 
Calls to establish more inclusive procedures have been more prominent, with all the main parties of the left, the Communists, Socialists and Greens, advocating at some point in recent elections the extension of voting rights to immigrants who have lived in France for a certain period. For example, in 1993, both the Communists and the Greens suggested that foreign nationals resident in France should have a right to vote in local elections; in 1997, the Greens suggested this right should be extended to presidential and national assembly elections. In 2002, the Socialists and Centre Right both called for voting rights for local elections for foreigners resident in France for ten years.
A final democratic theme to note is the concern with levels of participation. Like their British counterparts, French parties have come to acknowledge a degree of popular disengagement with established democratic practices. In their 1988 manifesto the Socialists talked about a ‘crisis of democracy’, and in 1993, the Communists argued that ‘people sense that they are being ignored and despised by those who are in control’. At the same election, the Gaullists suggested that only popular participation could remedy the widespread feeling among French citizens of being unable to influence the decisions affecting them. More recently, it has been the Greens who have expressed the greatest concern about voters’ disaffection with democratic politics:

What is really at stake is our parochial model of representative democracy that erects a wall between the ‘leaders’ and the ‘led’ and that is afraid of conscious citizens. Politics is discrediting itself when it hides behind economics and experts that determine the only possible solutions without any democratic debate.

As in Britain, French parties do not necessarily talk about democracy in the same way, but their manifestos have increasingly come to talk about participation and extending direct democracy and democratic inclusiveness. The Greens and the Communists have been most likely to talk in these terms, the Gaullists and the Centre Right the least likely. But the general trend is clear. To some extent, this tendency reflects a long-standing tradition of invoking the French people to legitimate public policy. But it also reflects a growing willingness by French politicians to speak the language of participation.

GERMANY 
We now come to Germany, the last of the three countries included in our analysis. Table 4 shows changes in various democratic themes addressed by the German parties. One very striking feature is the extent to which democracy, understood from an individual level, was virtually a non-issue in the manifestos published in the early federal elections. This fact almost certainly reflected a degree of ambivalence among the parties towards democracy after 1945. No German could forget, or be allowed to forget, that Weimar democracy had been undone by the Nazi party’s success at the ballot box. Indeed, there was a sense that, in order to make democracy work, it was first necessary to turn Germans into good citizens. Thus, in 1949, the founding year of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU argued that a progressive social policy ‘is meant to encourage the internal pacification of our people, to strengthen trust in the democratic order among broad segments of society’. Likewise, in its 1961 manifesto, the SPD contended: ‘It is crucial that our people come of age and learn how to resist any new threats to justice and freedom.’ And in 1965, the FDP’s manifesto asserted that ‘Democracy requires democrats’, but expressed doubt as to whether Germans qualified for that label. The party therefore argued that, ‘All education must endeavour to create loyal and critical citizens who can act independently.’ 
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It took time for German elites to abandon their distrust of the people. As a foretaste of this change, the SPD’s 1965 manifesto declared that: ‘Twenty years after the catastrophe we can establish that our people have passed the test. They are committed to democracy and want to defend it.’ However, distrust died hard among some politicians, especially those on the right. The Christian Democrat’s manifestos have never shied away from articulating the need to limit individual liberty in order to maintain political stability.
Clearly, distrust and wariness prevented parties from being enthusiasts about increasing individual participation. The shadow of the past may also have been a factor in the lack of introspection about the Federal Republic’s political system. There was little questioning of the institutional arrangements set out in the Basic Law; in fact, right up until the 1980s, very few references to democracy were about German democracy as a political system. Fear of the past, it seemed, fostered a reluctance to question the system.
Mirroring trends in Britain and France, references to democracy were few and far between during the early post-war period. Over time, however, most German parties’ statements about democracy became more favourable, with a growing emphasis on participation. The trigger for this change appeared to be the student protests of 1968 (Thomas, 2003). The events of that year, and the wider societal changes that had preceded them, would directly and indirectly shape subsequent manifesto references to democracy, in much the same way that the collapse of Weimar democracy affected earlier manifesto content. For example, the FDP in 1969 and the SPD in 1972 and 1976 responded by emphasising popular participation as a way of breaking deadlocked political processes and by talking up democracy’s ability to link citizens and political elites. 
As Table 4 shows, from 1969 onwards, the SPD and the FDP began referring to democracy in more varied ways than before, with participation and direct democracy becoming especially prominent. For example, the 1969 FDP manifesto argued that ‘New forms of democracy must give the citizen greater sway’ and pledged to introduce citizens’ initiatives, citizens’ petitions for referendums and legislative referendums, locally and at the federal level. 
From 1983, manifesto references to democracy were also affected by the arrival of a new German political force: the Greens. The Green party, which appeared for the first time during the 1983 election, became the most important champion of greater participation in West German democracy. In 1983, the party argued ‘for an alternative democratic culture that puts into effect the will of the citizens’. According to the 1987 Green manifesto:

The Greens stand for a different approach to politics, where policy is made from the bottom-up, together with people and not over their heads. As a grass-roots democratic party, we champion the right of the people concerned to decide for themselves. 

Such rhetoric did not go unheeded. It was almost certainly a factor in the Free Democrats and Social Democrats stepping up their own enthusiasm for democracy. In manifestos published in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the FDP and SPD became even more vocal in their support for the virtues of popular participation and the implementation of direct democratic practices. Thus, in its 2002 manifesto, the SPD stated: 

the Basic Law should enable broader citizen participation in the future, in addition to parliamentary elections: the popular initiative, petitions for referendums and [legislative] referendums should be possible at the federal level on the basis of meaningful quorums. 

However, unlike the Greens, who supported a ‘comprehensive democratisation of society’ in 1990, the FDP and SPD have been explicit that direct democracy was meant to complement representative democracy, not replace it. In the words of the 2002 SPD manifesto, ‘Representative democracy remains the rule’.
Other themes, including the extension of the elective principle and extending democratic inclusiveness, have also been touched upon in recent decades. The FDP has been a solitary and occasional voice calling for a directly elected federal president; the Social Democrats, the FDP and especially the Greens have also called for the voting age to be lowered and for voting and candidacy rights to be extended to foreign residents.
For their part, the CDU/CSU have been reluctant to echo the calls for greater participation made by their rivals. In its 1987 manifesto, the party refused to accept any extension of participatory democracy:
 
We affirm our belief in representative democracy, which combines political leadership and democratic responsibility. The CDU and CSU reject all forces that want to displace our representative, parliamentary democracy with so-called grassroots democratic movements.

Not even the British Conservatives revelled in such rhetoric. 
From 1980 onwards, German politicians also became more willing to question their democratic system. The Greens and the FDP repeatedly called for power to be decentralised, and the latter often called for changes to electoral practices. Yet, German parties remained less likely to call for a stronger parliament compared with some British and French parties. This reluctance was probably a reflection of the Bundestag already being a comparatively strong institution and an awareness that Germany’s federal system and the Bundesrat’s involvement in federal decision making often made for a ‘joint-decision trap’ (Scharpf, 1988). 
Like their British and French counterparts, however, German parties have become more receptive to concerns about the health of democratic processes. The FDP and the Greens have been particularly vocal in expressing concerns about the apparent disconnect between people and politicians. As the 1994 FDP manifesto put it: ‘Democracy thrives on citizen participation. It is alarming that many citizens no longer see the need to play a part in our democratic processes.’ In 1998, the Green manifesto promised to ‘counter the growing disenchantment with… a democracy offensive.’ To varying degrees, German parties now share a concern about citizens’ declining interest in politics. There is a growing mood that opportunities for democratic participation need to be expanded to counter this decline.

THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY-SPEAK
From our description of British, French and German manifestos, it is clear that references to democracy are framed by national contexts and concerns, such as the hereditary basis to Britain’s House of Lords, French grandeur or the German parties’ initial suspicions of their own citizens. It is also clear that there are important inter-party differences. However, there is no escaping the fact that the growing emphasis on participatory values appears to be a cross-national phenomenon. To varying degrees, parties in all three countries have engaged in this democracy-speak. Various individual-level themes, including support for individual participation, the extension of direct democratic procedures, extending the scope for elective office and extending the inclusivity of existing electoral procedures, are now staple features in most party manifestos. 
What might account for this general trend? One likely explanation is that the manifestos reflect parties’ responses to broader societal shifts. From the late 1960s, there was a growing intellectual interest in ideas about participatory and direct forms of democracy in many Western countries (Bachrach, 1969; Cook and Morgan, 1971; Barber, 1984). Profound changes occurred throughout Western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s: writing about Britain, Samuel H. Beer (1982) noted growing demands for greater justice, responsiveness, transparency, democracy and citizen participation in decision making, which he characterised as a ‘romantic revolt’ against deference and authority. He could have been writing about France and Germany. Ronald Inglehart (1971; 1977) famously interpreted these changes as an inter-generational shift in which materialist goals, such as economic and physical security, were giving way to post-materialist values, such as social equality, individual freedom and direct citizen participation, as people became more affluent and better educated. His thesis has been challenged (see, for example, Flanagan and Lee, 2003); but whatever its cause or nature, few people seriously dispute that there was a shift in mass values in some form or another. Today Western publics are generally more supportive of greater involvement in the policy making process and the extension of direct democratic devices like referendums (Dalton et al., 2001, 141; Dalton, 2006, 81; Donovan and Karp, 2006, 677-8). In line with Sartori’s characterisation of political parties as expressive instruments, British, French and German parties’ embrace of participatory values was probably a response to this shift. 
Latterly, and again in line with Sartori, parties seem to have responded to other changes in mass attitudes. The emergence of post-material values, better levels of education and a concomitant increase in voters’ political resources and skills are, if you like, positive factors in explaining growing support for participatory politics and direct democracy. But recent years have witnessed the rise of more negative influences on public attitudes (Donovan and Karp, 2006). Many people currently seem dissatisfied with the institutions of representative democracy, especially political parties, and the way they function (Norris, 1999; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004). If some British, French and German citizens are ideologically committed to altering the division of political labour, many are simply unhappy with the work done by the designated political labourers. As we have seen, recent manifestos in all three countries have noted the apparent estrangement between politicians and people. One response has been to call for the decentralisation of power and the strengthening of the legislative branch. Another solution has been to promise more and better democracy and to extend the opportunities for citizen participation.
However, parties not only respond, they also lead public opinion. In this respect, parties’ words have also perhaps fuelled a broader Zeitgeist that both understands and favours democracy in terms of direct participation. If some parties fuelled it, all parties now find themselves bound by it. There are political pressures on politicians to embrace participation. As others have already argued, ‘defending representative democracy is seen as regressive and almost undemocratic – an ironic reversal of the prevailing wisdom of the early postwar era’ (Dalton et al. 2001, 149). Brave indeed would be the party that now argued, as the British Conservatives did in 1945, that decisions could ‘only be taken by resolute and experienced men.’
Of course, there are still inter-party differences in the three systems we examined. These differences suggest the importance of party ideology as a mediating factor in explaining a party’s stated views about democracy. The manifestos of the centre-right parties were generally less enthusiastic about direct democracy and slower to embrace participation than the manifestos of the left-leaning parties. Democracy’s most enthusiastic supporters tended to be the Liberal and Green parties. They were more likely to espouse direct forms of democracy, were more insistent that measures be taken to improve participation and were most worried by citizens’ apparent disenchantment with politics.
Our analysis of the manifestos thus accord with Kittilson and Scarrow’s (2003, 60-4) analysis, which suggests that ideology affects a party’s disposition towards democracy. It is hardly surprising that the conservative, centre-right parties, were initially reluctant to espouse the virtues of direct democracy when such ideas were part of a societal revolt against the values and status quo they identified with. Likewise, centre-left and Green parties, with their tendency to advocate equality and participation, were readier to speak warmly of participatory democracy. 

DISCUSSION
Our survey of party manifestos in post-war Britain, the French Fifth Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany has shown how, in recent decades, parties have become more supportive of, and more vocal in their calls for, citizen participation in political decision making. Differences remain, but even the initially sceptical parties, such as the German Christian Democrats and British Conservatives, have been compelled to engage in such talk. 
The apparent embrace of participatory values has been manifested in various ways, not only in words, but also in deeds. Within political parties, internal democracy has arguably been extended. In all three countries, party members and activists have acquired a greater say over candidate selection, personnel and policy and, perhaps most importantly, leadership selection (Scarrow, 1999; Seyd, 1999; Faucher-King and Treille, 2003). To be sure, many changes were perhaps less about principled commitments to extending democracy than attempts to halt declining memberships, and some changes have had the effect of centralising power in the party leaderships (Scarrow et al. 2000, 142). Nevertheless, opportunities for involvement have increased.
Parties in Britain, France and Germany have also increased opportunities for citizen participation in governmental decision making (see Table 5 for an overview). A survey of 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 2001 found a general extension in the use of direct democratic devices at both the national and local level, as well as the extension of the elective principle to additional national and local offices (Scarrow, 2003, 48-9). According to the measures used, there was a doubling in the availability of referendums and personal elections in Britain, a small ten-percent increase in France and a remarkable eight-fold increase in Germany. Thus local, regional and national referendums are now part of Britain’s constitution, as are elected devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and directly elected local mayors (King, 2007). Thus all German Länder constitutions now contain direct democratic provisions, including citizens’ initiatives, and some Länder have also enacted provisions for local referendums and initiatives and the direct election, and even recall, of mayors (Kost, 2006). Thus provisions for local consultative referendums were introduced in France in 1992, even if their use has been exceptional (Bherer, 2003, 176). Even more recently, in July 2008, the French parliament narrowly approved amendments to the constitution that, in the process of strengthening the legislature, introduced the principle of the initiative into French politics: referendums could now be demanded by one fifth of MPs when supported by one tenth of the registered electorate.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

To be sure, not one of the countries yet resembles the United States, where, at the local and state level, elections, initiatives and referendums proliferate. Nor do they resemble Switzerland with its widespread use of referendums. Despite many pledges, the British electorate has only once been invited to vote in a national referendum. Likewise, it seems unlikely that German citizens will be allowed to take part in a federally organised referendum in the immediate future. Nevertheless, there have been changes, and they do constitute a shift of sorts in the overall division of labour between the people and their elected representatives.
To come back to the initial paradox, advocating more forms of direct democracy is not incompatible with maintaining a broadly representative system but fulfilling such pledges can be ‘a double-edged sword’ for politicians (Bowler et al., 2003, 734). One only needs to look to the United States, where parties are weak and devices like the initiative and recall have made the job of governing that little bit harder. Politicians who allow the people to decide an issue create, in effect, new veto players, who may block their desired policy outcomes. In Britain in 2004, for example, the Labour government initiated a regional referendum in the north east England to determine whether or not a directly elected regional assembly would be established. The idea’s main political sponsor, deputy prime minister John Prescott, was especially keen to see the proposal pass. The voters of north east England were not. They killed the idea. And, of course, some forms of direct democracy, like citizens’ initiatives, enable people to make decisions proactively, which can cause headaches for politicians. In a 2007 local initiative, for example, German voters in the Saarland blocked the construction of a major new coal-fired power station (The Economist, 2008). 
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TABLE 1: % sentences coded as ‘democracy’ by decade and by party in British, French and German manifestos



















TABLE 2: Democratic Themes in British manifestos, 1945-2005






1964	Lab		Lab, Lib	Con, Lib			Lab, Lib		Lib
1966	Lab		Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib		Lib	Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib
1970	Lab		Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib			Con, Lab, Lib	Lib	
1974 (F)	Lib	Lab	Lib		Con	Lib	Lib	Lib	Con, Lib
1974 (O)	Lab, Lib	Lab	Con, Lab, Lib			Con, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Con, Lib	
1979	Lib		Lab, Lib			Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Lib	Con, Lab, Lib
1983	Lab		Lab, Lib				Lab, Lib	Lib	Con, Lab, Lib
1987			Lab, Lib	Con, Lib			Con, Lab, Lib	Lib	Lab, Lib
1992	Lab, Lib		Lab, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Lib		Con, Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib
1997		Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib	Lab		Lab, Lib	ConLabLib	Lab, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib
2001	Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Lib	Lib	Con, Lib	Con, Lab, Lib	Lab, Lib	Con, Lib




TABLE 3: Democratic themes in French legislative manifestos, 1958-2007










1993	Com, Gau	Com, Gau, Soc, Greens		Com, Greens		Com, Gaul	Com, Gau, Soc, CR		Com, Soc
1997	Com, Greens, CR	Com		Greens			Soc, Greens, CR	Com, Greens	Soc
2002	Com, Gau, Soc, CR	Com, Gau, Soc, Greens, CR	Greens	Com, Soc, CR		Greens	Soc, Greens, CR	Com, CR	Soc, Greens, CR
2007	Com, Gau, Greens	Com, Soc, Greens	Greens	Com	Greens	Greens	Soc, Greens	Com, Gau, Greens	Gau, Soc, Greens


TABLE 4: Democratic themes in German manifestos, 1949-2005













1994	FDP, Greens	SPD, FDP, Greens	FDP	SPD, FDP		FDP, Greens		FDP, Greens	
1998	SPD, Greens	SPD, Greens		Greens		Greens			
2002	SPD	SPD, FDP, Greens	FDP	Greens				FDP	





TABLE 5: The extension of democracy in Britain, France and Germany since 1960
	Britain	France	Germany
1960s	Welsh local initiatives (Sunday drinking)Lowering of voting age to 18	National referendumsDirect presidential elections	
1970s	National referendumRegional referendumsParochial referendumsDirect Elections to the European Parliament	Lowering of voting age to 18Direct Elections to the European Parliament	Lowering of voting age to 18Direct Elections to the European Parliament
1980s	Directly elected school boards		
1990s	Directly elected devolved assembliesDirectly elected mayors Local referendums for instituting directly elected mayors	Local consultative referendums	Extension of regional referendums and initiativesExtension of local referendums and initiativesExtension of directly elected mayors
















^1	  The CMP’s methodology entails the manual coding of each and every quasi-sentence – defined as ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’ – of manifesto text into one of 56 variables (Budge et al., 2001, 96-8). The variables can then be reported as a percentage of the total number of quasi-sentences, which, in turn, can be interpreted as an indicator of salience for a given issue in that manifesto.  
^2	  The data span legislative elections for which we were able to obtain CMP data. Elections between 1945 and 2002 were covered in CMP publications (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006). Data for the 2005 British and German elections were obtained from Judith Bara and Andrea Volkens, to whom we are both very grateful.
^3	  To those familiar only with the British and German party systems, party politics in the Fifth Republic are confusing. There are numerous parties, of varying persuasions, and they frequently change their names. The Gaullist and centre-right parties are especially culpable. We rely on François Petry and Paul Pennings (2006), the leading experts on French party manifestos, to determine which parties were Gaullist and centre-right at any given election. 
^4	  The party manifestos were made available in electronic form through a joint effort between the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU) and the Party Manifestoes Project. We would have preferred to focus on only those quasi-sentences that were coded as ‘favourable references to democracy’ by the CMP. However, it was not possible to determine how quasi-sentences in each manifesto were coded, as the original coded documents were no longer available. For this reason, we analysed all references to democracy in all manifestos. Our analysis, therefore, covers a larger number of favourable references than the original CMP codes.
^5	  The Green party manifestos cover elections since 1993. Unfortunately, and despite the best efforts of the Central Archive in Berlin, we were unable to locate ten French manifestos: Communists, 1968; Socialists, 1958, 1973 and 1978; centre right 1962, 1973, 1978, 1988 and 2007; and the Gaullists, 1978.
^6	  The Green party manifestos cover federal elections since 1983.
^7	  All translations are by the authors.
^8	  This is partly a problem of missing manifestos.
